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“They [pleasure and pain] govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think” (Bentham, 1780, p.1)
Physical inactivity is one of the most widely reported risk-factors associated with many non-
communicable diseases, including cardiovascular disease, diabetes mellitus, cancer, obesity,
hypertension, stroke, osteoporosis, and depression (Warburton et al., 2006; Bravata et al., 2007),
as well as overall global mortality (World Health Organization, 2010). Interventions that increase
physical activity can reliably reduce the impact of these undesired outcomes. However, the key
question facing research and theory is how best to conceptualize the associated psychological
factors, which ultimately determine adherence to behavioral change. Social-Cognitive models of
behavior, including the Theory of Planned Behavior, Transtheoretical Model, and Social-Cognitive
Theory, represent popular explanatory frameworks, which can help practitioners understand how
best to improve physical activity behavior.
In recent years, however, the usefulness of these models has been questioned. Research shows
social-cognitive models typically only account for approximately 25% of the variation in exercise
and physical activity behavior, which limits the effectiveness of related interventions (Ekkekakis
and Dafermos, 2012). Instead, exercise behavior may be better understood by looking beyond the
purely cognitive and social components. Recent research demonstrates affective components can
predict physical activity behavior. For example, Williams et al. (2008) found affective responses
to acute moderate-intensity exercise predicted subsequent physical activity levels in sedentary
adults between 6 and 12 months later. These findings, which have been replicated (e.g., Kwan and
Bryan, 2010), suggest interventions that manipulate the affective response to physical activity could
improve long-term physical activity behavior.
A growing body of literature now promotes affective models, and their synthesis with social-
cognitive theories (Kiviniemi et al., 2007; Calitri et al., 2009; Lawton et al., 2009). Within some of
these accounts (Williams et al., 2008; Nasuti and Rhodes, 2013), the term “hedonism,” which refers
to a theory of human motivation in which individuals are motivated to experience pleasure and
avoid pain, is being increasingly used to explain the predictive utility of these affective components
(Ekkekakis and Dafermos, 2012). For instance, Williams et al. (2008) argues for “hedonic theory
to [focus] on affective responses to behavior” (p. 232), while Cabanac (2006) asks whether the
“...hedonic dimension of perception is what motivates and optimizes behavior...” (p. 111). Indeed,
Ekkekakis and Dafermos (2012) declare “the foundation has now been laid for the development
of a hedonic theory of exercise behavior” (p. 325). Despite this trend, there is a general failure in
both the physical activity and psychology literature (in the round), to define what is actuallymeant
when referencing to hedonism per se. Thus, the aim of this article is to first discuss the definitional
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problems associated with hedonism, and then briefly explore
how the lack of clarity therein has hindered the development of
modern affective accounts of adherence to physical activity. We
hope this discourse will ultimately aid theorists and practitioners
alike who seek to understand adherence better, in terms of the
related affective states.
In psychology hedonism typically refers to the assumption
that an individual will normally “...approach pleasure and avoid
pain...” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1280), or when “...pleasure seeking
is the main motivator of human behavior” (emphasis added,
Veenhoven, 2003, p. 437). At first glance, these definitions
indicate that while both the pursuit of pain and avoidance of
pleasure are important drivers of behavior, other motivators can
legitimately contribute their “votes” toward biasing subsequent
actions. Upon closer inspection, however, amore extreme version
of hedonism also exists in the literature. For instance, Sober and
Wilson (1999) argue that in psychological hedonism “avoiding
pain and attaining pleasure are the only ultimate motives that
people have; everything else that we want, we want solely as a
means to achieving those twin ends” (p. 2). Similarly, Vroom
(1964) suggested hedonism’s central assumption is that: “In
every situation people select from alternative possibilities the
course of action which they think will maximize their pleasure
and minimize their pain” (p. 9). Finally, Mees and Schmitt
(2008) argued that the principle postulate of classical hedonistic
motivational theory is that “actions are ultimately carried out to
maximize the level of one’s own pleasure and to minimize one’s
own pain” (p. 157).
Hedonism can thus be defined in a most extreme sense, in
which no other motivational drivers exist beyond the pursuit of
pleasure and avoidance of pain [hereon referred to as Ultimate
Psychological Hedonism (UPH); (Mees and Schmitt, 2008)].
Therefore, when developing modern theories of motivation for
physical activity it is crucial to delineate between UPH and
its less extreme counterpart [Partial Psychological Hedonism
(PPH)], which can accommodate alternative motivational
drivers. Indeed, such confusion is evident in Weiner’s (1992)
work, where hedonism is defined as “a utilitarian doctrine
[which] asserts that pleasure and happiness are the chief goals
in life” (p. 29). Since this statement invites the possibility of
other motivational drivers, which sub-serve this “chief” goal,
it is unclear if this definition invokes either UPH or PPH. In
contrast, Weiner (1992) later states that “the single principle on
which most theories of motivation agree is that persons seek
to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain, with motivation
derived from this fundamental law” (emphasis added, p. 353).
Following his brief critique of hedonism’s validity as a theory
of human motivation, Weiner (1992) also states “If humans do
not always act as hedonic maximizers, then other motivational
principles are needed” (p. 357). Moreover, when Higgins (1997)
states: hedonism refers to the idea that individuals “approach
pleasure and avoid pain” (p. 1280), and that hedonism “...is the
basic motivational assumption across all areas of psychology...”
(p. 1280), it appears easy to conflate these two forms of hedonism.
Thus, with the rapid growth in popularity of hedonistic-
referenced affective accounts, we strongly recommend that
future models in physical activity behavior account for these
different hedonistic perspectives, and clearly define the version
they refer to. While these inaccuracies may seem trivial, there
may be important unintended consequences of misrepresenting
hedonism in motivational theory. Primarily, we argue the main
problem is that unclear definitions prevent academics from
effectively challenging theoretical components. If authors argue
that UPH underpins a particular theory, then key aspects of the
UPH component can be contested. For instance, UPH is widely
considered as unfalsifiable, which is empirically problematic for a
theoretical model (Vroom, 1964; Locke, 1975; Steers et al., 2004).
Moreover, serious logical corollaries may also be unnecessarily
invoked. For instance, inadvertently adopting UPH rather than
PPH implies an acknowledgment that human nature is purely
deterministic, wherein humans have no free will to behave
outside of their affective confines. Thus, the individual who
passionately “gives themselves to the cause,” or behaves “out
of principle,” would only be deemed to be altruistic or morally
virtuous in terms of their effort to obtain the underlying pleasure
or pain avoidance for them self alone. This approach would
radically transform how many lay people view human nature,
toward a self-centered or self-serving perspective (Nahmias et al.,
2005; Baumeister, 2008; Sarkissian et al., 2010).
As Locke (1975) states, determinism “wipes out the possibility
of ethics” (p. 462), leading UPH to be controversial at best,
and morally repulsive at worst (Timmermann, 2005). On
top of this, a deterministic view of human nature may also
unnecessarily conflict with distal aspects of motivational theory,
which are incompatible with determinism. For example, Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) is inherently humanistic in its
focus, with its emphasis on the growth of human potentials
(Ryan et al., 2008). Yet, if SDT’s hedonistic components are
vague in definition, or if this theory overlooks different hedonistic
perspectives, as is the case in one such article (Ryan et al., 2008),
viewing SDT through a deterministic lens, in which individuals
are inherently selfish, causes inherent conflict.
Mistakenly implicating UPH rather than PPH is likely to
negatively impact the coherence of a theory or framework.
Articles detailing Approach-Avoidance Motivation (AAM), for
instance, often present hedonism as the intellectual basis of
their framework (Elliot, 2006). However, Elliot (2006) also
states: “Self-conceptions, implicit theories, attachment schemas,
environmental affordance, cultural values and norms” (p. 114)
can underpin goal-directed behavior. However he does this
without explicitly delineating if such determinants, which would
presumably be lower down in the hierarchy of needs, are simply
a further means to obtain pleasure or reduce pain. Moreover,
Higgins (1997) states hedonism to be “the basic motivational
assumption of theories across all areas of psychology, including
theories of emotion in psychobiology, conditioning in animal
learning, decision making in cognitive and organizational
psychology, consistency in social psychology, and achievement
motivation in personality” (p. 1280). Yet Higgins (1997) appears
to refer to PPH and not UPH, despite the fact Vroom (1964) and
others (Locke, 1975; Steers et al., 2004) argue UPH is unfalsifiable
and therefore empirically redundant.
Confronting this definitional issue is essential, and can be
achieved within the physical activity literature by taking a few
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important steps. Firstly, making oneself aware of the different
forms of hedonism that exist, and the consequential logical
corollaries that may be implicated, is an essential precaution
when operating in a field with inherent definitional challenges
(Ekkekakis and Petruzzello, 2000). This increased awareness will
promote the sensitivity in which hedonistic terms are used, and
ensure the definitional problems that have occurred in other
domains are prevented from developing. Secondly, if there is
any chance of miss-representation of hedonistic terms, we advise
authors to make explicit what they mean, rather than opting for
brevity. Indeed, clearly discounting UPH in a text is preferable if
there is potential for it to be implicated without intention.
To conclude, the future is promising for physical activity
research. The field is moving away from models that exclusively
account for social or cognitive components, and toward models
that additionally account for affective components. However,
the indiscriminant use of hedonistic terms in different areas of
psychology and philosophy has hindered the ability to accurately
determine which version of hedonism is actually intended. The
aim of this article is to bring attention to the indiscriminate use
of hedonistic terms, and highlight the consequential effects of
such actions. It is hoped the physical activity literature will benefit
from being better equipped, so as to use hedonistic terms more
appropriately for the development of more refined theoretical
models of behavior.
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